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Bryan's Partner:
Arthur Sewall and the Campaign of 1896
by
L eonard  Schlup
A rth u r Sewall, a wealthy sh ipbuilder and the D em o­
cratic vice-presidential nom inee in 1896, was born  in 
Bath, Maine, on N ovem ber 25, 1835. Following in the 
tradition o f his father, he began a career in shipbuilding in 
1854, form ing a business with his o lder b ro ther, Edward. 
He later added  a son and a nephew  as partners. T he 
Sewall family specialized in wooden vessels and  built a 
num ber o f ships, such as the Granger and Eric the Red, 
tha t eventually gained recognition. In  1893, the yard was 
equipped  with a steel plant, and  from  it the first steel 
sailing ship built in the U nited  States was launched the 
following year.1 Sewall’s last ship, p roduced  shortly after 
his death  on Septem ber 5, 1900, was the William P. Frye, 
which sank on Jan u ary  28, 1915, m aking it the first 
A m erican vessel to fall victim to the G erm ans during  
W orld W ar I. A lthough not known fo r innovative naval 
architecture, Sewall probably constructed, owned, and 
operated  m ore sailing vessels du ring  the latter part o f the 
n ineteen th  century  than  any o ther person in the U nited 
States.2
In  addition  to his career in shipbuilding, Sewall engaged 
in o th e r pursu its that enhanced his economic and social 
position. He served as a d irecto r o f  railroads, including 
the M aine C entral Railroad, his state’s principal railway 
system. T h e  M aine residen t also held stock in several large 
corporations, and was p residen t o f  the Bath National 
Bank fo r nearly th irty  years. Known for his executive
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ability and  indefatigable energy, he ea rned  a rep u ta tio n  
in New E ngland as a shrew d businessm an and  spokesm an 
fo r railroad  and  banking interests.
A D em ocrat living in a Republican stronghold , Sewall 
ap p eared  to be a political renegade. First, as an im perialist 
in foreign  policy and  a protectionist in ta riff  legislation, he 
espoused a philosophy tha t basically ran  coun ter to th a t o f 
G rover Cleveland, the  D em ocratic p residen t from  1885 to 
1889 and  again from  1893 to 1897. Secondly, a lthough  he 
was a person  o f wealth, he advocated a tax on personal 
income. Finally, w hen it came to financial policy, Sewall, 
unlike m ost o f  his conservative cohorts, favored the free 
and unlim ited coinage o f silver at the trad itional ratio o f 
16 to 1, a policy designed to encourage inflation. In  this 
respect, he opposed  the m aintenance o f the gold standard , 
dem anded  the restoration  o f silver to its p ro p er place in 
the m onetary  system, and criticized C leveland’s economic 
p rogram  in genera l.3
Sewall played only a small role in D em ocratic politics 
p rio r  to his nom ination fo r vice-president o f the U nited 
States. Elected to m inor positions as councilm an and 
alderm an  in Bath, he never held state o r national office. In  
fact, he ran  fo r the U nited States Senate in 1893 bu t lost to 
Eugene Hale, the Republican incum bent. In  spite o f his 
lack o f a hom e base from  which to operate  politically, 
Sewall was e ither a delegate o r visitor to his p a rty ’s 
national conventions from  1872 to 1896. T h e  Bath 
politician even served on the executive board  o f the
Dem ocratic N ational Com m ittee from  1888 to July , 1896, 
but failed to retain his position when his sound m oney 
colleagues from  M aine refused  to endorse him  again 
because o f his sym pathy for silver. Sewall th o u g h t this 
defeat m eant the end o f his political career, bu t thirty-six 
hours later, he won his party ’s nom ination fo r the second 
highest office in the nation .4
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T h e  D em ocrats, divided into factions o f  goldbugs and  
silverites, converged on Chicago in July , 1896, to nom inate 
the ir s tandard -bearers fo r that y ea rs  cam paign. T h e  
advocates o f free silver cap tu red  control o f the con­
vention, succeeded in writing a p latform  favorable to 
the ir cause, rep u d ia ted  the Cleveland adm inistration , and  
nom inated  W illiam Jenn ings Bryan o f  N ebraska for 
president. Possessing oratorical skills as well as a m agnetic 
personality, B ryan aroused  the enthusiasm  o f the silverites 
at the convention with his “cross o f  go ld” speech. T hey  
had  found  a leader at last to fight fo r the ir sacred dogm a.
O n July 11, 1896, at the Coliseum  in Chicago, the 
delegates concluded the ir last official duty  by selecting 
a v ice-presiden tial cand idate . Several asp iran ts w ere 
considered  fo r this position, bu t the th ree  fro n tru n n e rs  
were Sewall, Jo h n  R. M cLean o f Ohio, the wealthy p u b ­
lisher o f  the Cincinnati Enquirer and  p ro p o n en t o f  free 
silver, and  R ichard Parks Bland, a soft m oney politician 
from  M issouri.5
D uring  the official proceedings, William R. B urk, a 
delegate from  California, placed Sewall in nom ination. In  
a b rie f address, he u rged  his colleagues to consider ability 
for the office as well as geographical d istribution in 
balancing the ticket. R em inding the Dem ocrats o f Sewall’s 
loyalty to silver, B urk concluded: “You will m ake no 
m istake in nom inating  h im .”6 Two o th e r  delegates, 
C harles S. T hom as o f C olorado and  Jo h n  Scott o f Maine, 
seconded the nom ination.
Like Bryan, Sewall obtained the nom ination on the fifth 
ballot. T h e  Bath D em ocrat cap tu red  100 votes on the first 
roll call o f states, 37 on the second, 97 on the th ird , 261 on 
the fou rth , an d  568 on the final count. His selection was 
then  m ade unanim ous. O n all five ballots, the twelve 
delegates from  M aine loyally su p p o rted  the ir favorite son, 
with the exception o f the second roll call when four were 
absen t.7
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Sewall won the Dem ocratic vice-presidential spot on the 
ticket in 1896 fo r two basic reasons. T h e  most im portan t 
consideration  was the a ttem p t to balance the ticket 
geographically. As a New England businessm an and  
banker, Sewall had ties with a region o f the nation w here 
none existed fo r Bryan. W hen the conservative Dem ocrats 
from  the east bolted the party that year in p ro test against 
the nom inee and platform , the available supply o f  possible 
candidates from  whom to select a ru n n in g  m ate was 
reduced considerably. Even though  he was identified with 
New England, Sewall did not com m and the political 
support o f his hom e area, fo r B ourbon D em ocrats there 
did not trust him  on the vexatious currency issue. In  short, 
hopes that Sewall would pacify and soothe the ruffled 
feelings o f eastern  Dem ocrats m et with d isappointm ent.
T h e  delegates obviously were determ ined  to nom inate 
a silverite in whom they had  confidence ra th e r than  a 
su p p o rte r o f the gold standard  for second place on the 
ticket. With this idea in m ind, they probably w ould have 
done better had  they selected V ice-President Adlai E. 
Stevenson, a m oderate  bim etallist from  Illinois, who 
enjoyed the a tten tion  o f both  the conservatives and  liberals 
in the D em ocratic party. A coalition D em ocrat who 
p reach ed  the  politics o f  accom m odation , S tevenson, 
vice-president u n d e r  Cleveland, could have acted as a 
bridge betw een the old guard  and  the new in 1896. 
Because he was a political m odera te  who proposed  
solutions to heal in ternal w ounds and  because he strongly 
endorsed  both  Cleveland and Bryan, he em erged  as the 
D em o cra tic  T a lle y ra n d  an d  po litica l ra r ity  o f  his 
generation .8 A lthough the D em ocrats in 1900 finally 
reco g n ized  S tev e n so n ’s q u a litie s  as a co m p ro m ise  
candidate to run  with Bryan, they should have em ployed 
that tactic in 1896, thereby creating a m ore unified party  
structure. By nom inating Sewall, the Bryan delegates 
o ffered  the Clevelandites practically no th ing  and  suc­
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ceeded only in antagonizing the agrarian  elem ents within 
the ir own organization and the People’s party.
A second basic reason fo r Sewall’s nom ination  was to 
equalize the ticket in term s o f  age. Bryan, thirty-six years 
old in 1896, was viewed by many as a youthful new com er 
who lacked experience. Indeed , he had  served only fou r 
years in the national H ouse o f Representatives, lost a bid 
in 1894 to becom e senator, and  occupied no elective office 
at the time o f  his nom ination. A lthough Sewall’s political 
train ing  was far less, he was sixty-one years old in 1896 
and  could act as an e lder statesm an.
O nce again the delegates e rred  in choosing Sewall to 
fulfill this role in the cam paign. H olding no elective office 
such as governor o r senator, and  com ing from  a state with 
few electoral votes, Sewall did no t add  streng th  to the 
ticket in the way that Stevenson could have done in 1896. 
T h e  vice-president was also sixty-one, b u t unlike the 
M aine D em ocrat, he held an im portan t office and  lived in 
a populous state. M oreover, Stevenson was politically 
s tronger in Illinois than  Sewall was in M aine, although 
both were Republican states.
Because the m ajority o f  Maine D em ocrats su p p o rted  the 
Cleveland adm inistration  on econom ic policy and believed 
tha t free coinage was unwise, Sewall’s nom ination seem ed 
m ore incongruous than  expedient. N evertheless, Bryan, 
who took no p art in the vice-presidential contest, accepted 
the final choice. A lthough he had  not been personally 
acquainted with the New England D em ocrat p rio r to the 
tim e o f the convention, Bryan knew that Sewall had 
favored him  for the presidency on a free silver p latform . 
T h e  N ebraskan cam e to appreciate Sewall’s “sterling 
qualities,” “the dep th  o f his convictions and his possession 
of m oral courage ,” and his loyalty in being “a tho rough  
D em ocrat.”9
U pon the conclusion o f the Chicago convention, Sewall 
re tu rn ed  to New E ngland to begin p repara tions fo r the
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fall cam paign. In  a speech at Boston on Ju ly  15, he 
rem arked:
The serious condition of the country demands free silver, and the 
voters in New England are beginning to find it out. We ought to have a 
new State Convention in Maine, and a new free silver platform fo r . .. 
some . . . good man to stand on. It is not right to have a State campaign 
there not in harmony with the National platform.10
Sewall arrived in Bath on Ju ly  15, w here he received the 
cheers o f his friends, a tten d ed  receptions, and  was 
escorted to his m ansion. Recognizing the honor and  duty 
which his unexpected  nom ination had conferred  upon  
him, the politician from  M aine encouraged his neighbors 
to co m p re h en d  th e  significance o f  the  D em ocratic  
convention. It rep resen ted  a new beginning tha t would 
lead to a better day fo r Am ericans. In  replying to a 
welcoming address from  the citizens o f  Bath, Sewall said:
We have had a convention, and it is of that I would speak to you. It was 
a great convention, yet it did not seem to me to be a partisan one. It 
seemed more like the uprising of the people, and they seemed to be 
controlled by one idea, and that idea has filled me for years. They knew 
that this country is in deep distress, that it has been in distress for years, 
and that the great trouble is with our monetary system, and they 
believed, as I believe, that there is but one remedy.11
Two weeks after his re tu rn  to M aine, the Democratic 
vice-presidential nom inee renew ed his attack on the gold 
standard . M aintaining that the only issue o f the cam paign 
was the currency question, he claimed that ‘The silver 
ranks [were] growing daily stronger in M aine.”12 Because 
the ta riff  had  not relieved economic difficulties o r ended  
the paralysis o f business conditions b rough t on by the 
Panic o f 1893, the only rem edy, according to Sewall, was 
the rem onetization o f silver. “W hat the people w ant is 
right and cannot be otherw ise,” he asserted .13
T en  days following this statem ent, Sewall held an 
interview at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City and 
fielded a num ber o f questions. He im plied that the gold 
Dem ocrats would not change m atters in his state. “M aine is
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hopelessly R epublican ,” he said, “for the Republicans 
th e re  have a good organization, and  they keep their fences 
in good o rd e r  all the year a ro u n d .”14 A dm itting that the 
Dem ocrats would not concentrate as m uch time in Maine 
as they had done in 1892, Sewall observed that the 
dom inan t issue had  been m ade in the west ra th e r than in 
the east. Because o f this, the effect o f  the early election 
re tu rns in M aine on o th e r states would not be as influential 
as in the past. In m aking this rem ark , Sewall obvious­
ly w anted to p ro tec t h im self against the potentially  
em barrassing loss to the Republicans o f his own state 
du ring  the cam paign .15
O n A ugust 12, 1896, Bryan and Sewall were officially 
notified at M adison Square G arden o f the ir nom inations 
for p residen t and  vice-president, respectively. B ryan’s 
long, dull speech d isappointed many who had antici­
pated  an inspirational and rousing address. Even Sewall, 
having a palm  leaf fan, endeavored  to make him self 
as c o m fo rtab le  as possib le  d u r in g  B ry a n ’s b o r in g  
perform ance. Ultimately the people began to disperse. 
W hen G overnor William J. Stone o f Missouri in troduced  
Sewall, the beleaguered  ru n n in g  m ate had the m isfortune 
of speaking to nearly em pty galleries. O ne new spaper 
co rresponden t described the situation when he reported : 
“Vice Presidential candidate Sewall m ade a short speech of 
acceptance, bu t the crowd was on its feet going from  the 
hall when he did it, and  no one heard  anything that he 
said. H ad he declined the nom ination no one would have 
been the w iser.”16
In his acceptance speech Sewall pointed out that the 
Coinage Act o f 1873, which had dem onetized silver, was 
a g reat w rong inflicted upon  the A m erican people. 
Advocating a re tu rn  to the traditional m onetary system of 
bimetallism, the vice-presidential con tender u rged  that the 
U nited States not wait for o ther nations to cooperate in 
this venture. R ather, he asked for im m ediate action on the
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sole initiative o f  the Dem ocratic leaders to eradicate 
poverty and  bankruptcy  and safeguard A m erican in­
stitutions. Sewall explained:
The demonetization o f silver has thrown the whole primary money 
function on gold, appreciating its value and purchasing power. Restore 
the money function to silver and silver will appreciate and its 
purchasing power increase. Take from gold its monopoly, its value will 
be reduced and in due course the parity o f the two metals will again 
obtain under natural causes. We shall then have a broad and unlimited 
foundation for a monetary system, commensurate with our country’s 
needs and future development, not the unsafe basis o f today reduced 
by half by the removal of silver and continually undermined by 
foreigners carrying from us our gold.17
T h e  D em ocratic party  split openly in 1896 betw een the 
followers o f  B ryan, on the one hand , and  the  p roponen ts 
o f  a sound  m oney policy, on  the  o ther. T h e  la tte r g roup , 
consisting o f such political leaders as P residen t Cleveland, 
m em bers o f  his cabinet, and  Senator William F. Vilas o f 
W isconsin, vehem ently rejected the Chicago p la tfo rm  and  
Bryanism . “W ho ever d ream ed ,” q u eried  Postm aster 
G eneral William L. Wilson, “th a t the day would come 
w hen Bryan would be the Presidential nom inee o f the 
g reat D em ocratic Party? W hat a degrada tion  to th a t old 
organization and  w hat a hum iliating cheapening  o f the 
Presidency!”18 A conservative D em ocrat in Kentucky 
c o m p la in e d  th a t  th e re  was n o t “ th e  firs t io ta  o f  
D em o cracy ” in  th e  C h icago  p la tfo rm  a n d  th a t  it 
rep resen ted  a populistic d o cum en t.19 “You can never 
placate nor win over the free silver D em ocrats. N othing  
can be expected from  them . ..  .T he situation is d ep lo r­
able, bu t the path  o f duty  is p la in ,” w rote an o th e r ex­
p o n en t o f  B o u rb o n  ph ilosophy  to S en a to r W illiam  
Lindsay o f Kentucky, a sound money D em ocrat.20
Viewing with alarm  the direction in which the ir party  
was m oving, nearly a thousand  d isgruntled  conservatives 
convened in Ind ianapo lis in S eptem ber. T h e re  they 
adop ted  a p la tfo rm  tha t called fo r the m aintenance o f  the
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gold stan d ard  and selected the venerable Jo h n  M. Palm er 
o f  Illinois and  Simon B. B uckner o f  Kentucky as the 
nom inees o f  the new N ational Dem ocratic party  for 
p residen t and  vice-president, respectively. “A strong ticket 
p u t up  at Ind ianapo lis ,” professed  an enthusiastic gold 
D em ocrat to H enry  W atterson, ed ito r o f  the Louisville 
Courier-Journal, “will settle the fate o f  Bryan and  Sewall 
and  doom  them  to certain  defea t.”21
While these D em ocrats clearly realized that they could 
no t cap ture the W hite H ouse in 1896, they proposed  a 
separate  ticket with the hope that it would provide 
incensed B ourbons with a place to rally and  indirectly aid 
William McKinley o f Ohio, the conservative Republican 
nom inee fo r p residen t.22 For those gold D em ocrats who 
could no t su p p o rt the Republican candidate because o f 
principle, the appearance o f  the Palm er ticket would 
perm it them  “to exercise the ir suffrage in a becom ing 
m an n er.”23 Cleveland was especially pleased with this 
political alternative to Bryan and  McKinley. In  a le tter to 
Vilas, he revealed:
I am delighted with the outcome of the Indianapolis Convention and as 
a democrat I feel very grateful to those who have relieved the bad 
political atmosphere with such a delicious infusion of fresh air. Every 
democrat after reading the platform ought to thank God that the 
glorious principles of our party have found defenders who will not 
permit them to be polluted by impure hands.24
A lthough the action o f  the gold D em ocrats distressed 
Sewall, he found  him self in an unusual p redicam ent in 
1896 because o f the appearance o f ano ther organization 
on the political scene, the Populists. This party, appealing 
especially to farm ers and debtors in the western and 
sou thern  states, had  nom inated Jam es B. W eaver o f  Iowa 
for p residen t in 1892, and  won some electoral votes. 
Favoring a num ber o f economic, social, and political 
reform s, including free coinage, the Populists assembled 
in Saint Louis in late July, 1896, to choose their presidential
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and  vice-presidential team. In  fact, B ryan had  earlier 
encouraged  them  to postpone the ir decision until afte r the 
D em ocratic and  Republican conventions had  com pleted 
the ir w ork so that the Populists could “take advantage o f 
the erro rs  o f  the old parties.”25
W hen the Populists met, they were confron ted  with an 
im m ediate political dilem m a. T o  nom inate Bryan as the ir 
candidate would consolidate their party  with the D em ­
ocrats and  Silver Republicans on the issue o f currency 
reform , and toge ther they could oppose the sound money 
Republican ticket. O n the o th er hand , if the Populists 
united  with the Dem ocrats to obtain victory, they m ight 
lose their own separate identity in the process. For this 
reason , the Populist o rgan iza tion  split betw een the 
m id d le-o f-th e -ro ad ers  who w ished to p rese rv e  th e ir  
d is tin c t ex is ten ce , an d  th e  fu sio n is ts  w ho fav o red  
assimilation with others. A leading M innesota Populist 
delineated this perp lex ing  problem  w hen he confided to 
his diary: “Shall we o r shall we not endorse Bryan for 
president? I like Bryan, bu t I do not feel that we can safely 
adopt the Dem. candidates. I fear it will be the end  o f ou r 
party .”26
T o resolve this quandary , the Populists com prom ised in 
1896 by nom inating Bryan for p residen t on a free silver 
p latform  but chose a radical exponen t o f  populism , 
Thom as E. W atson o f Georgia, fo r vice-president. In  
doing this, they even took the unp reced en ted  step o f 
nam ing W atson before m aking the presidential choice.27 
This decision left Bryan with two ru n n in g  m ates and 
com plicated the political situation considerably.
A lthough W eaver, an influential fusionist, favored the 
nom ination o f  Sewall, most Populists absolutely refused  to 
consider the Maine businessm an for second place on the ir 
ticket.28 For one thing, he came from  the w rong region o f 
the nation. M oreover, they d istrusted  his wealth and
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business connections. In  o th e r words, o rthodox  Populists 
had  no th ing  in com m on with him  except su p p o rt fo r 
the white metal. W hen the Populists selected the ir vice- 
presidential cand idate  on Ju ly  25, they voted 539 fo r 
W atson and  257 fo r Sewall. A stam pede then  began, 
resulting in the G eorgian s unan im ous nom ination .29
T h e  alliance that Bryan w anted to cem ent with the 
Populist party  was en d an g ered  by the con tinuation  o f 
Sewall on the D em ocratic slate. B ryan had  m istakenly 
hoped  that the Populists would tem porarily  subord inate  
th e ir  goals an d  select Sewall, th e reb y  u n ify in g  all 
organizations in su p p o rt o f one ticket. W hen this d id  no t 
occur, the N ebraskan, p ledging to do no th ing  “u n fa ir” to 
Sewall, refused  to d ro p  his ru n n in g  m ate and  basically 
ig n o re d  W atson  d u r in g  th e  c a m p a ig n .30 His s tan d  
im m ediately antagonized m any leaders o f  the People’s 
party. For exam ple, Senator M arion B utler o f  N orth  
Carolina, who d irected  a cam paign o f  fusion with the 
Dem ocrats, inveighed against the re ten tion  o f  the M aine 
politician. “T h e  Populist Party cannot and  will not swallow 
Sewall,” he w arn ed .31
W atson also d em an d ed  the rem oval o f  his coun terpart. 
Describing Sewall as “a w art on the p arty ” and  “a dead  
weight to the ticket,” the sou thern  radical conducted  a 
de term ined  cam paign to elim inate the New England 
D em ocrat from  fu rth e r  political consideration .32 O n Ju ly  
29, W atson w ired the ed ito r o f  a D em ocratic new spaper in 
A tlanta tha t the
Democratic managers must not demand that the Populists do all the 
yielding. You must do some o f it yourselves. Sewall can come off the 
ticket without hurting his party. My withdrawal would kill mine. Our 
people cannot be led to the support o f Bryan and Sewall. Unless Sewall 
retires, the masses o f our party will, in my judgment, demand a straight 
Populist ticket.33
T h e  action o f the Populists in choosing W atson placed 
Sewall in a ticklish political situation. O n Ju ly  25, the very
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day that the G eorgian obtained the vice-presidential 
nom ination, Sewall mailed a le tter to Bryan outlin ing his 
thoughts on the results o f the Saint Louis convention. 
W riting from  Bath, he expressed concern with published 
reports indicating Bryan was undecided  w hether to accept 
o r decline the Populist presidential nom ination. Sewall 
candidly u rged  the N ebraskan not to allow any personal 
consideration for his p a rtn e r from  M aine influence his 
ultim ate decision. He added:
I desire that you will do just what you believe is best for the success of 
the head of our ticket. The principles we are fighting for are so 
paramount of any personal relations that the latter should not have any 
weight or influence whatever with your action. I cannot for a moment 
allow myself to be a factor in any action on your part that would in the 
slightest degree hazard an electoral vote for you. I will write you later in 
regard to the conditions in this State, which are, I am happy to say, 
improving.34
Stories circulated freely th ro u g h o u t the cam paign that 
Sewall would be persuaded  to w ithdraw  in favor o f 
W atson. N ew spapers followed the events quite closely and 
rep o rted  on a variety o f  m atters relating  to Sewall’s 
possible resignation from  the ticket. O n July 28, Jo h n  
A. B reidenthal, a m em ber o f  the Populist Executive 
C om m ittee, stated  th a t the D em ocratic and  Populist 
com m ittees p lanned  to arrange a solution so that B ryan’s 
first runn ing  m ate could be w ithdraw n.35 Two days later, 
in an interview  with rep o rte rs  at his hom e, Sewall 
responded  to this report: “Any m an who for a m inute 
would en tertain  such an idea is no t w orthy o f being 
answ ered .”36 O n A ugust 10, when asked about W atson’s 
intentions, the M aine D em ocrat calmly adm itted  th a t he 
did not think the sou thern  Populist had any plans to resign 
from  the ticket.37
O n Septem ber 1, 1896, Sewall sent an o th e r message to 
Bryan. Once again he u rged  that personal com m itm ents 
not be perm itted  to im peril the cause fo r which they were
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fighting, fo r the p ro g ram  was o f  vital im portance to the 
nation. T h e  B ath D em ocrat also wrote:
We are now in the heat of our Campaign and conditions, I think, 
confirm my first view, that if we had carried out our original plans we 
would have made a great success. Of course, I can give you no reliable 
estimate of the result now. We are doing all we can with our own 
resources, and hope for fair results. We can hardly expect, however, to 
reduce the plurality of ’92. If we can keep it under fifteen to eighteen 
thousand, I shall consider it a great victory for silver.38
Events involving the  vice-presidential question m oved 
ra th e r swiftly in Septem ber. Due to the fact th a t m any 
D em ocrats objected to fusion with the Populists fo r fear 
o f  appearing  to be disloyal to Sewall, party  leaders o ften  
found  them selves in a tenuous position. Senator Jam es K. 
Jones o f A rkansas, chairm an o f  the D em ocratic N ational 
Com m ittee, was caught in the m iddle o f  the  debate, bu t he 
d efended  Sewall’s nom ination. “T h e  talk about the re ­
tirem ent o f  o u r  candidate  fo r V ice-President,” he assured  
his colleagues, “is too absurd  to be seriously considered .”39 
O n Septem ber 3, Jones, som ew hat ind ignan t with the 
w idespread rep o rts  o f  alleged deals, said:
He [Sewall] sees no embarrassment whatever in Mr. Bryan’s 
nomination for President by another party and upon another ticket, but 
believes it to be an important step toward certain victory for the silver 
cause. It is a complete answer to efforts of the gold Democrats to create 
the impression that Mr. Sewall will retire in any circumstances to say 
that the Democratic Party and its National organization are just as loyal 
to Mr. Sewall as he himself is to Mr. Bryan and the great cause o f the 
common people.40
Following the  reassurances o f  su p p o rt from  Jones and  
B ryan, Sewall accelerated  the  verbal attacks on  his 
o p p o n e n ts . H e issu ed  a s ta te m e n t f ro m  B a th  o n  
S ep tem b er 5: “Any sta tem ents o r  in ferences th a t I 
p ro p o se  to w ith d raw  fro m  th e  tick e t a re  w ith o u t 
foundation . I never had, and  have not now, the rem otest 
in ten tion  o f do ing  so.”41 A week later, w hen a persisten t 
re p o r te r  asked if he p lanned  to resign, Sewall, losing his
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tem per, snapped: “I ’ve answ ered that question time and  
time again. I d o n ’t propose to answer it again. T h e  answ er 
I already have given stands, and th a t’s all I have to say.”42
In  spite o f  these denials, stories continued to surface 
th a t Sewall w ould resign. M aintain ing  th a t Sewall’s 
nom ination had  been “a great m istake,” M arion Butler, 
chairm an o f the Populist National Com m ittee, p leaded 
with the New England politician to w ithdraw .43 T h e  New 
York Times eagerly rep o rted  on Septem ber 16, that Sewall’s 
political star was surely sinking, for the nom inee had  
becom e a b u rd en  on the Dem ocratic party and  was 
re g a rd e d  as an  ea s te rn  p lu to c ra t by th e  P o p u lis t 
organization .44 T o  add  to the suspense o f the m om ent, 
ano ther uncorrobora ted  rep o rt revealed that Democratic 
S enato r A rth u r  P. G orm an  o f M aryland h ad  been 
appoin ted  to persuade his friend  in Maine to rem ove 
him self from  the Chicago ticket. M oreover, the ru m o r 
contained the scintillating idea that W atson would also be 
retired , and  both politicians would then  be replaced with a 
less aggressive Populist or a m ore convenient D em ocrat 
who could harm onize contending factions.45
T h e  potential problem s that a double-tailed ticket posed 
for Bryan and Sewall were indeed enorm ous. Certainly 
the most dangerous one concerned the m atter o f  fusion 
e lec to ra l tickets in tw en ty -e igh t sta tes. U n d e r  this 
a rra n g e m e n t, O hio  D em ocrats, fo r  exam ple , could  
co n ced e  five o r  m o re  o f  th e ir  tw e n ty -th re e  vice- 
presidential electors to the Populists while California 
Democrats m ight relinquish four out o f  nine electors. In a 
letter to C hairm an Jones on A ugust 31, Sewall clearly 
pointed out tha t he was cognizant o f  the repercussions o f 
electoral com binations, bu t he au thorized  fusion on 
electors. T he vice-presidential candidate wrote:
In all states where fusions seem to you desirable and important for the 
election of Mr. Bryan, I want my personal consideration to be entirely 
disregarded to that end. I believe success is secure for our ticket if you
202
can unite the silver forces of the country and all personal interests 
should be subordinate to that. As nominee of the Demorcratic party, I 
desire that any combination, or fusion, in the several states where the 
straight Democratic ticket may be uncertain of success, shall be made 
that will more certainly secure the electoral votes for the head of our 
ticket.46
U nfortunately , the feasibility o f  this plan left u n ­
answ ered w hat would happen  to Sewall should a chain 
o f circum stances com bine to deny him  an election victory 
to which he was entitled. In  o th e r words, while Bryan 
would receive all the electoral votes o f the states he 
carried, the fusion plan would split the electoral count 
betw een Sewall and  W atson. T h e  possibility existed, 
barring  a g reat silver victory and landslide vote for the 
N ebraskan, th a t Bryan could win the presidency bu t that 
Sewall could lose the vice-presidency. M oreover, should 
neither Sewall n o r W atson obtain a m ajority o f electoral 
votes in a close election, the U nited States Senate, u n d er 
the  provisions o f  the  C onstitu tion , w ould have the 
responsibility to elect a new vice-president. Because 
Republicans nom inally controlled the u p p er cham ber, 
they would have been in a position to vote for G arret A. 
H obart o f New Jersey, the vice-presidential nom inee o f 
their party, ra th e r than  fo r Sewall. A B ryan-H obart 
ad m in is tra tio n , ironically  en o u g h , was one possible 
outcom e o f the  presidential election o f 1896.47
Because o f  W atson’s nom ination, Sewall did not take an 
active p a rt in the presidential cam paign. R ather, he 
devoted m ost o f  his atten tion  to New England politics. 
H e also m anaged to write letters, g reet visitors, hold 
interviews, and  deny reports that he p lanned  to withdraw 
from  the D em ocratic ticket. In  a speech on the Boston 
Com m on, in the presence o f Bryan, on Septem ber 25, the 
beleaguered  ru nn ing  m ate served notice on his Populist 
detractors as well as his sound m oney opponents in the 
D em ocratic and  Republican parties that he was not about 
to quit. “We are in this fight to stay,” he em phatically
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declared .48 I t was a crucial battle betw een the people, on 
the one side, against the m oneyed powers, on the o ther. 
For Sewall, who stood with the patro its o f 1896 in 
opposing evil and injustice, the cause was too g reat to 
w arran t o th er considerations.49
W hen Bryan tou red  New E ngland d u rin g  the final days 
o f Septem ber, 1896, Sewall accom panied the presidential 
nom inee on th a t political sojourn. T h e  two D em ocrats, fo r 
exam ple, visited Portland, Maine, on S eptem ber 26, and  
spoke at the U nion Station Square. T h en  they d ep a rted  
fo r Bath to visit the hom e town o f  the vice-presidential 
contender. Local D em ocrats and  m em bers o f  the free 
silver clubs p arad ed  th rough  the streets and  escorted the 
candidates to the Custom  H ouse w here Bryan delivered a 
b rief address on Septem ber 26. T h e  m odel o f  a ship built 
by Sewalfs com pany was a featu re o f this procession. 
U pon  the conclusion o f the speeches, B ryan  spen t 
Saturday n igh t and  the following day at Sewall’s hom e.50
O n O ctober 6, from  his hom e in Bath, Sewall w rote his 
official le tte r accepting the Dem ocratic vice-presidential 
nom ination. R eferring  to the “deadly evil o f  the gold 
s tan d ard ,” he charged  tha t the greatest m onopoly o f all 
was the m onopoly o f the pow er o f  gold and  th a t its 
control had  created  class distinctions.51 Sewall re ite ra ted  
his belief tha t free coinage provided the rem edy with 
which to check cu rren t wrongs and undo  the ru in  o f 
the past. T h e  cand idate  fu r th e r  e labora ted  th a t his 
nom ination  h ad  no t been a p erso n a l tr ib u te  b u t a 
guaran tee tha t the Dem ocratic party  was a national ra th e r 
than  a sectional organization. H e also observed:
We have rescued our party from those who, under the influence of the 
money power, have controlled and debased it. Our mission now is to 
rescue from this same power, and its foreign allies, our own beloved 
country. . . .We know well the nature of the struggle in which we are 
engaged. We are anxious only that the people of the land shall 
understand it, and then our battle is won.52
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U pon the conclusion o f  the cam paign o f 1896, Sewall, 
quite naturally , p red icted  victory for the Bryan-Sewall 
team . O n election day, N ovem ber 3, he voted early, spent 
the rest o f  the day quietly in Bath, and  then  received 
the re tu rn s  at his hom e in the library over a private w ire.53 
T h e  re su lts  w ere  d is a s tro u s  fo r  th e  D em o cra tic  
standard-bearers. McKinley was elected presiden t by a 
handsom e majority, receiving 7,104,779 popu lar votes to 
6,502,925 fo r Bryan. T h e  People’s party  polled a vote o f  
222,583 while the gold D em ocrats won only 133,148. In  
term s o f the electoral count, McKinley obtained 271 votes 
by w inning 23 states. Bryan, on the o th er hand , cap tu red  
176 votes w hile c a rry in g  22 sta tes . F o r th e  vice­
presidency, the electoral vote was divided between th ree 
contenders. H obart won 271 votes to 149 fo r Sewall. 
W atson received 27 electoral votes.54 “W hat a relief the 
result is to all business m en ,” w rote a delighted su p p o rte r 
o f McKinley to Republican Senator S tephen B. Elkins 
o f West V irginia.55
New England went solidly fo r McKinley, a predictable 
result that still m ust have been difficult fo r Sewall to 
contem plate. His own state served as an illustration o f the 
trend  th ro u g h o u t the northeast. T he Republicans gained 
a larger plurality in M aine than  four years earlier. In  fact, 
Sewalfs hom e city and  w ard w ent against him. McKinley 
carried  Bath, receiving 1,234 votes to 472 fo r Bryan. T h e  
w ard vote showed a final tally o f  167 fo r the Ohio 
Republican to 66 fo r the N ebraskan.56 In  conceding 
defeat, Sewall said in part: “We are in fo r four years o f 
governm ent by in junction .”57
Nearly two weeks after the election, Sewall reflected 
on events tha t had  contribu ted  to Republican success. 
Convinced tha t a large p ropo rtion  o f the people favored 
silver, the defea ted  candidate blam ed the press, church 
leaders, and businessm en fo r their stubborn  opposition to 
Bryan. He also stated that only tim e would tell about the
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wisdom o f the decision ren d ered  by the electorate on 
N ovem ber 3. Should business im prove and  prosperity  
re tu rn  u n d e r  the gold standard , then  it would m ean that 
the silver patriots o f 1896 had  been wrong. O n the o ther 
hand, if their theories were correct, there  would be 
no p e rm an en t p rosperity  w ithout the resto ra tion  o f 
bimetallism. Sewall fu rth e r  prom ised the A m erican people 
tha t
the cause of free silver will go on just the same as if the election had not 
gone against us. The fight will be kept up. Considering the influences 
which were against us, we achieved what is in a sense a victory.58
T h e  long-range effects o f the presidential election o f 
1896 were fa r g rea ter than  Sewall had  im agined in his 
sum m ation o f  the cam paign. T h e  election with which he 
was involved tu rn ed  ou t to be one o f the most im portan t 
contests in A m erican history. All the political protest, 
economic discontent, and  social tension o f the previous 
thirty years clim axed in tha t decisive cam paign and  led to 
a realignm ent o f political forces and a new governing 
coalition tha t dom inated  the nation, fo r the m ost part, 
until the Dem ocratic displacem ent o f the Republican 
m ajority in 1932.59 It was Bryan, fo u n d er o f  the m odern  
Democratic party, who provided the transition between 
the conservative p rogram  o f P resident Cleveland and 
the progressive package developed later by the adm in ­
istrations o f W oodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt.
A lthough Bryan and Sewall were quite opposite in term s 
o f style, charism a, and  background , they sh ared  in 
com m on a vision for their nation and party. In  fact, they 
were som ewhat ahead o f the ir time with reg ard  to the 
political, economic, and  social reform s tha t they advocated 
in the late n ineteen th  century. M oreover, both D em ocrats 
were enigm atical leaders from  d iffe ren t regions o f  the 
nation who tu rn ed  a political relationship in 1896 into a 
personal friendsh ip  o f lasting value.
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T h e  most ou tstand ing  characteristic o f Sewall’s conduct 
du rin g  the cam paign o f 1896 was his willingness to 
sacrifice his own am bition fo r the good o f  the cause. Even 
though  he an n o u n ced  publicly his d e te rm in a tio n  to 
rem ain on the  ticket, the businessm an-politician wrote 
private letters to Bryan prom ising to resign in o rd e r  to 
enhance the prospects fo r victory. T h e  N ebraskan refused  
to consider d ro p p in g  his political p a r tn e r  and  la te r 
concluded that, u n d e r  the existing circum stances, two 
ru n n in g  m ates were b e tte r than  one.60
Sewall re tired  from  political endeavors a fte r his defeat 
in 1896, but continued  to m aintain an active in terest in 
party  affairs. H e a tten d ed  the  D em ocratic N ational 
Convention in July , 1900, and hoped  to celebrate B ryan’s 
victory over McKinley tha t au tum n. H e did no t live to 
witness the conclusion o f the cam paign and  B ryan’s 
second defeat. Suffering  a fatal stroke o f  apoplexy at his 
su m m er hom e at Sm all Po in t, M aine, he d ied  on  
Septem ber 5, 1900, leaving beh ind  a m em ory that quickly 
faded into political obscurity.
— NOTES —
1 William J. Bryan, The First Battle: A Story of the Campaign of 1896 
(Chicago: W. B. Conkey Company, 1896), p. 230.
2 New York Times, July 12, 1896, p. 2.
3 Ibid, September 6, 1900, p. 7 Also, Paolo E. Coletta, William Jennings 
Bryan: Political Evangelist, 1860-1908 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1964), p. 149.
4 Bryan, The First Battle, p. 232.
* New York Times, July 12, 1896, pp. 1-2. Also, Louis W. Koenig,Bryan: 
A Political Biography of William Jennings Bryan (New York: G. P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1971), p. 206.
207
6 Bryan, The First Battle, p. 222.
7 Ibid., pp. 223-27.
8 Adlai E. Stevenson (1835-1914), vice-president of the United States 
from 1893 to 1897, was the grandfather of Adlai E. Stevenson II 
(1900-1965), the late ambassador to the United Nations, and the 
great-grandfather of Adlai E. Stevenson III, United States Senator 
from Illinois.
9 William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, The Memoirs of 
William Jennings Bryan (Chicago: John C. Winston Company, 1925), 
p. 117. Also, Bryan, The First Battle, p. 229.
10 New York Times, July 16, 1896, p. 2. Sewall had earlier attended the 
Maine State Convention but not as a delegate. He was a delegate, 
however, to the Democratic National Convention. See The Review of 
Reviews, XIV (August, 1896), p. 140.
11 Bryan, The First Battle, p. 232.
12 New York Times, August 1, 1896, p. 5.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., August 11, 1896, p. 1.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., August 13, 1896, p. 1.
17 Bryan, The First Battle, p. 437.
18 William L. Wilson to Isidor Straus, July 11, 1896, quoted in Festus 
P. Summers, William L. Wilson and Tariff Reform (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953), p. 242. Also, George D. Wise to 
Wilson, October 17, 1896, William L. Wilson Papers, West Virginia 
University Library, Morgantown.
19 John Stites to William Lindsay, August 1, 1896, William Lindsay 
Papers, University o f Kentucky Library, Lexington.
20 Wilbur F. Browder to Lindsay, August 1, 1896, ibid.
21 W. B. Haldeman to Henry Watterson, August 22, 1896, Henry 
Watterson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
22 John M. Palmer, Personal Recollections of John M. Palmer: The Story of 
an Earnest Life (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke Company, 1901), pp. 594-95, 
619. For additional information on the presidential election o f 1896, 
see the appropriate sections in Horace Samuel Merrill, Bourbon 
Democracy of the Middle West, 1865-1896 (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1967); Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and 
Expansion, 1890-1900 (New York: Harper 8c Row, Publishers, Inc., 
1963); Paul W. Glad, The Trumpet Soundeth: William Jennings Bryan and 
His Democracy, 1896-1912 (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press,
208
1960); Stanley L. Jones, The Presidential Election of 1896 (Madison: 
University o f Wisconsin Press, 1964); J. Rogers Hollingsworth, The 
Whirligig of Politics: The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1963); H. Wayne Morgan, William 
McKinley and His America (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963); 
and Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage (New York: 
Dodd, Mead and Company, 1933). Also, see Horace Samuel Merrill, 
Bourbon Leader: Grover Cleveland and the Democratic Party (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1957), pp. 44, 207.
23 Fred Heinz and L. M. Fisher to William C. Whitney, June 19, 1896, 
William Collins Whitney Papers, Library o f Congress.
24 Grover Cleveland to William F. Vilas, September 5, 1896, William 
Freeman Vilas Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison. 
Also, Wilson to John M. Palmer, September 30, 1896, John McAuley 
Palmer Papers, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield.
25 William Jennings Bryan to Ignatius Donnelly, January 1, 1896, 
Ignatius Donnelly Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint Paul.
26 Ignatius Donnelly, Diary, July 18, 1896, Ignatius Donnelly Papers.
27 C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 299.
28 John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance 
and the People's Party (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 
1931), pp. 362-65.
29 Woodward, Tom Watson, p. 300. Also, Robert F. Durden, The 
Climax of Populism: The Election of 1896 (Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1966), passim,
30 Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan, p. 117 Also, 
Woodward, Tom Watson, p. 309.
31 Quoted in ibid., p. 316. Also, Koenig, Bryan, pp. 243-45.
32 Quoted in H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National 
Party Politics, 1877-1896 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969), p. 
514. Also, Thomas E. Watson to Marion Butler, July 28, 1896, Marion 
Butler Papers, University o f North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, also, 
Butler to Watson, September 14, 1896, Thomas E. Watson Papers, 
University o f North Carolina Library.
33 New York Times, July 30, 1896, p. 1.
34 Arthur Sewall to Bryan, July 25, 1896, William Jennings Bryan 
Papers, Library o f Congress. Bryan accepted the Populist nomination.
35 New York Times, July 29, 1896, p. 1.
36 Ibid., July 31, 1896, p. 1.
209
37 Ibid., August 11, 1896, p. 1.
38 Sewall to Bryan, September 1, 1896, Bryan Papers.
39 New York Times, September 4, 1896, p. 6.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., September 6, 1896, p. 5.
42 Ibid., September 14, 1896, p. 1.
43 Ibid., September 9, 1896, p. 3.
44 Ibid., September 16, 1896, p. 1.
45 Ibid., September 18, 1896, p. 1. Vice-President Stevenson 
vigorously denied reports that he had been asked to serve as the 
com prom ise vice-presidential choice. See The Daily Bulletin 
(Bloomington, Illinois), October 4, 1896, p. 6. Stevenson loyally 
supported the Bryan-Sewall ticket. See William M. Springer to Bryan, 
August 12, 1896, William McKendree Springer Papers, Chicago 
Historical Society Library, Chicago.
46 Sewall to James K. Jones, August 31, 1896, Bryan Papers.
47 New York Times, August 31, 1896, p. 2. To avoid a repeat 
performance o f the debacle of 1896, the fusionist Populists in 1900 
endorsed Stevenson, the Democratic vice-presidential nominee, for 
second place on their ticket.
48 Ibid., September 26, 1896, p. 2.
49 See H. C. Bell to William Lochren, July 14, 1896, William Lochren 
Papers, Minnesota Historical Society. Also, James Manahan to Mrs. 
James Manahan, September 12, 1896, James Manahan Papers, 
Minnesota Historical Society.
50 New York Times, September 27, 1896, p. 5. Bryan assured the 
citizens of Bath that he and Sewall had “no hostile designs against the 
people o f the east.” See Bryan, The First Battle, p. 504.
51 New York Times, October 7, 1896, p. 1.
52 Bryan, The First Battle, pp. 437-39.
53 New York Times, November 3, 1896, p. 5.
54 Joseph Nathan Kane, Facts About the Presidents: A Compilation of 
Biographical and Historical Data (2d ed.; New York: H. W. Wilson 
Company, 1968), p. 164.
55 Russell B. Harrison to Stephen B. Elkins, November 10, 1896, 
Stephen B. Elkins Papers, West Virginia University Library. Also, John 
Hay to Whitelaw Reid, November 7, 1896, Whitelaw Reid Papers, 
Library of Congress.
56 New York Times, November 4, 1896, p. 3.
210
57 Ibid. There have been a few presidential and vice-presidential 
candidates, o f both major parties, who were residents of Maine. The list 
includes Hannibal Hamlin, James G. Blaine, Arthur Sewall, and 
Edmund S. Muskie. Interestingly enough, of these four leaders, only 
Sewall lost his home state on election day. The Lincoln-Hamlin ticket in 
1860, the Blaine-Logan ticket in 1884, and the Humphrey-Muskie 
ticket in 1968 all won the popular and electoral vote of Maine.
58 Ibid., November 14, 1896, p. 16. In a letter to Bryan dated one 
month after the election results, Sewall emphasized that silver should be 
the issue again in 1900. See Sewall to Bryan, December 3, 1896, Bryan 
Papers. Probably the most embarrassing personal incident for Sewall 
during the campaign of 1896 involved the intense opposition of his son, 
Harold Marsh Sewall, to the Democratic ticket headed by Bryan. Young 
Sewall had been appointed consul general at Samoa by President 
Cleveland during his first administration but was recalled from that 
position. Harold was later reappointed to the same position by 
President Harrison. During this process, young Sewall renounced 
Democratic principles and turned Republican partly out of revenge. He 
served as a delegate-at-large from Maine to the G. O. P. convention in 
1896, strongly supported McKinley throughout the campaign, and 
ultimately was sent as United States Agent to Honolulu by the new 
Republican president to represent the administration there. In other 
words, the son of a vice-presidential candidate worked against his own 
fathers ticket in 1896. See New York Times, September 6, 1900, p. 7.
59 V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (5th ed.; New 
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), pp. 170-71, 535-36. Also, 
Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American 
Politics (New York: W. W. Norton 8c Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 1-10.
60 Bryan, The Fust Battle, p. 298. Also, Gilbert C. Fite, "William 
Jennings Bryan and the Campaign of 1896: Some Views and 
Problems,” Nebraska History, XLVII (September, 1966), pp. 247-64.
Leonard Schlup received his Ph.D. in history from  the University 
of Illinois at Urbana in 1973, fo r  his study o f the political career 
of Adlai E. Stevenson (1835-1914). Dr. Schlup is currently an 
associate professor o f history at Texas Womans University at 
Denton.
211
